From John Curry, October 8, 2007
  
 CORE members (and others) ...please take the time to  not only read what the COREofOEA says in the lines below but take the time to  download the 8 page Adobe download of the court opinion [posted below].  Basically, this court ruled in favor of the OEA retirees and  reversed a lower court decision. John 
  
 Note: any writing below this line is from the  COREofOEA. 
  
 RETIREES WIN ROUND 2--  
  
 APPEALS COURT SAYS LOWER COURT ERRED; 
 CASE IS REMANDED TO DISTRICT COURT ON CONTRACT  LANGUAGE 
  
 In a unanimous decision, the 6th District Court of Appeals ruled  in favor of retirees that the Summary Plan Description (SPD) cannot  override contract language allowing OEA to unilaterally terminate our health  insurance benefits. 
  
 Now, the case goes back to District Court to rule on whether or not the  contract language says what we know it says—that OEA is to provide the Medicare  Supplemental Insurance Coverage to bring us up to the level of coverage we had  to age 65; in the case of OASU, to provide Major Medical Coverage that includes  the prescription drug reimbursement benefit. 
  
 Here's an excerpt from the hearing where one of the Judges grilling OEA's  attorney about OEA's position; inquiring about OEA's position re: staff, and  applying that to its representation of teachers, a School Board could issue an  SPD "that takes away something that you contractually bargained..." Judge  McKeague stated: "This is an astounding position for the Education  Association to take in terms of its practical impact on every teacher in the  state you represent..." 
 CONGRATULATIONS to all our OEA retirees for “hangin’  in there” to see this through! We are one step closer to restoring our insurance  benefits. We’ll need to really step up financial support as we get ready for the  next round! 
  
 This is a win not only for OEA retirees, but for our brothers and sisters  throughout NSO and other unions (including our OEA education employee  members) that a contract means what it says. Special thanks to NSO and  the UAW for filing “friend of the court” briefs in support of our position.  
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 Remember..."IT'S IN THE CONTRACT!"  
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 This UPDATE is a communication to CORE [of OEA]  members and friends... 
 COALITION OF RETIRED EMPLOYEES OF THE OHIO EDUCATION  ASSOCIATION (CORE of OEA) 
 Seeking a Just and Fair Resolution  
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Original Adobe version: 
   
 HTML version: 
 Text of the court opinion taken from the Adobe  download:    
 *The Honorable Karl S. Forester, Senior District Judge for the Eastern  District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT  PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 File Name: 07a0405p.06 UNITED  STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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JAMES I.  PRATER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OHIO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,  Defendant-Appellee. X---- ,----N No. 06-4393 Appeal from the United States  District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. No.  04-01077—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., District Judge. 
 
Argued: September 13, 2007 Decided and Filed: October 3, 2007 Before:  SUTTON and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, District Judge.*
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COUNSEL ARGUED: David M. Cook, COOK, PORTUNE &  LOGOTHETIS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Rodger L. Eckelberry, BAKER &  HOSTETLER, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David M. Cook, Robert E.  Rickey, Stephen A. Simon, COOK, PORTUNE & LOGOTHETIS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for  Appellant. Rodger L. Eckelberry, Manuel Jose Asensio III, BAKER & HOSTETLER,  Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. Michael F. Saggau, Daniel W. Sherrick, ASSOCIATE  GENERAL COUNSEL, Detroit, Michigan, Lisa M. Smith, Samuel C. McKnight, KLIMIST,  McKNIGHT, SALE, McCLOW & CANZANO, Southfield, Michigan, for Amici Curiae.
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OPINION
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SUTTON, Circuit Judge.  James Prater and several other retired employees of the Ohio Education  Association (“OEA”) claim that OEA improperly terminated their health benefits,  which
(they say) had become vested and irreducible through a series of  collective bargaining agreements. Relying in part on our decision in Maurer v.  Joy Technologies, Inc., 212 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2000), the district court  rejected the claims as a matter of law. Because we conclude that Maurer does not
1 No. 06-4393 Prater et al. v. Ohio Education Association Page 2 apply here,  because after-the-fact unilateral summary plan descriptions cannot supercede the  amendment provisions in a collective bargaining agreement and because the  contracts are otherwise ambiguous about whether they promise lifetime,  irreducible health benefits to employees upon their retirement, we reverse. I.  In its capacity as a union, OEA represents teaching professionals throughout  Ohio. Unions are employers too, however, and, in its capacity as an employer,  OEA employs numerous individuals who are represented by two other unions: the  Professional Staff Union (“PSU”) and the Ohio Associate Staff Union (“OASU”).  OEA has negotiated several collective bargaining agreements with these unions,  and these agreements have provided for retiree healthcare benefits since 1978  for PSU retirees and since 1981 for OASU retirees. Plaintiffs Montgomery and  Whaley, former associate staff employees of OEA, retired in 1999 and 2000, and  they seek to represent a class of OASU retirees. Plaintiffs Thorley, Prater and  Westfall, former professional employees of OEA, retired between 1984 and 1994,  and they seek to represent a class of PSU retirees. The OASU Agreements. When  Montgomery and Whaley retired, the collective bargaining agreement for OASU  employees said that it represented “the full and complete commitments between  both parties and [could] be altered . . . only through the voluntary, mutual  consent of the parties in a written and signed amendment.” JA 1101. The  agreement provided active employees with medical insurance covering  “hospitalization; surgical; major-medical; out-patient X-ray; EKG; laboratory;  prescription drug; dental; and optical.” JA 1080. Retirees, the agreement said,  “shall be included in the Association group in regard to: hospitalization;  surgical; out-patient; and majormedical coverage,” but, “[a]fter the retiree  reaches age 65, the Association is required to provide only major-medical  coverage.” JA 1086. The collective bargaining agreement also required the  company to give each employee “an individual contract guaranteeing the retiree  health benefits at the time of retirement.” Id. The PSU Agreements. Like the  OASU contract, the PSU collective bargaining agreements in force when Prater,  Thorley and Westfall retired provided that changes could be made “only by an  amendment properly signed and ratified by each party.” JA 1387, 1501, 1566. The  first provision for retiree benefits, in a subsection entitled “Continuation of  Benefits,” said that “[t]he Association shall continue to provide all benefits  provided by Sections 11.0112 and 11.0113 of this Contract for each retired  employee to age sixty-five.” JA 1357 (Thorley); JA 1468 (Prater); see also JA  1547–48 (Westfall). The next subsection, entitled “Reimbursement for Cost of  Medicare,” said that OEA “shall reimburse each retired employee over age  sixty-five . . . for the cost of Medicare Part B.” Id. And under the next  subsection, entitled “Supplement to Medicare,” the agreement said that OEA  “shall supplement the benefits of Medicare Parts A and B to provide benefits at  a level equal to those benefits provided by Sections 11.0112 and 11.0113 of this  Contract for each retired employee to age sixty-five.” Id. The Summary Plan  Descriptions. OEA, like other employers, distributes summary plan descriptions  to its employees to assist them in understanding the more detailed, complex and  formal plan documents. Each of the summaries distributed to the plaintiffs  contained reservation-of-rights clauses. The summary distributed to the OASU  retirees provided: “Retired employees may continue coverage, in accordance with  the collective bargaining agreement . . . . While the employer expects retiree  coverage to continue, the employer reserves the right to modify or discontinue  retiree coverage at any time.” JA 1832. Elsewhere the OASU summary said that OEA  “may modify or amend the Plan from time to time in accordance with the provision  of the collective bargaining agreement.” JA 1851. No. 06-4393 Prater et al. v.  Ohio Education Association Page 3 The reservation-of-rights clauses in the PSU  summaries did not say that any modifications to benefits must be in accordance  with the bargaining agreements. “The Plan Administrator,” they said, “may change  or eliminate benefits under the plan and may terminate the entire plan or any  portion of it.” JA 1934 (Thorley); JA 1976 (Prater); see also JA 2045  (Westfall). The Dispute. For two decades, OEA provided most of its retirees with  insurance to supplement Medicare after they reached 65. On March 1, 2004, OEA  sent a letter to PSU employees informing them that OEA would honor its  “contractual commitment[]” to reimburse retirees for Medicare Part B but would  no longer pay for the “optional, supplemental coverage” it had been providing.  JA 98. That same day, OEA sent a similar letter to OASU retirees, informing them  that “OEA’s obligation to provide coverage ceases” when each retiree reaches the  age of 65. JA 138. On August 31, 2004, OEA terminated the retirees’ supplemental  coverage. The OASU and PSU retirees filed this class action under Section 301 of  the Labor Management Relations Act, claiming that the union had violated the  collective bargaining agreements. OEA moved for summary judgment on the PSU  retirees’ claims for post-65 supplemental insurance, and it moved for summary  judgment or partial summary judgment on the OASU retirees’ claims for  prescription drug, surgical, hospitalization and outpatient coverage. After the  parties had filed their summary judgment papers, the retirees sought leave to  amend their complaint to add several ERISA claims. The district court held that  the contracts unambiguously excluded the sought-after coverage. It reasoned that  the “to age 65” clause in the PSU agreement “indicates a limitation on coverage  available and is not at all ambiguous.” D. Ct. Op. at 11. And it reasoned that  the OASU agreement contained a “limitation on coverage [that] could not be more  clear or unambiguous.” Id. at 12. The court also held that the plan summaries  reserved to OEA an unqualified right to alter or terminate the retirement  benefits under Maurer, 212 F.3d at 919, and ultimately granted OEA’s motion for  summary judgment on all claims. D. Ct. Op. at 15–16. The court denied the  retirees’ motion for leave to amend because the litigation was at an advanced  stage. II. At the same time that ERISA carefully regulates the vesting of  pension benefits, it leaves the decision of whether employers will provide  employees with healthcare benefits upon retirement to contract—a contract that  may come in the form of a collective bargaining agreement, an at-will employment  relationship or something in between. See UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476,
1479 (6th Cir. 1983); Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th  Cir. 1998); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 579–80 (6th Cir.  2006). In the past, the application of “ordinary principles of contract  interpretation” to these different types of agreements, Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580,  has raised a host of perplexing questions: What is required to establish an  employer’s commitment to provide lifetime benefits to retirees? What exactly are  lifetime healthcare benefits? Does a promise of lifetime benefits mean that they  cannot be reduced over the life of a retiree? What if the employer reduces  health benefits for active employees or increases the cost of those benefits to  active employees? What if the employer increases some health benefits for active  employees but reduces others? Must the retiree take the bitter with the sweet?  Or is it a ratchet—with only the improvements in health benefits available to  the retiree but with no compulsion to take any reduction? Happily for us, this  case sidesteps these questions—at least for now. OEA concedes that, in the  absence of a right to terminate retiree benefits under the reservation-of-rights  clauses in the summary plan descriptions, a fact dispute exists over whether the  retiree benefits provided for in the collective bargaining agreements survive  the term of the agreements. That leaves two related but distinct disputes for us  to resolve: (1) Are the retirees’ claimed benefits among those enumerated No.  06-4393 Prater et al. v. Ohio Education Association Page 4 in the collective  bargaining agreements? (2) Did OEA’s plan summaries give the union the right to  terminate any health benefits provided for in the collective bargaining  agreements? A. In interpreting collective bargaining agreements, we consider the  language of the agreement, the context in which that language appears and other  traditional canons of construction. McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., 390 F.3d 417,  422 (6th Cir. 2004). If, after applying these rules of interpretation, the  contract remains ambiguous, we permit the parties to introduce extrinsic  evidence about their original understanding of the contract’s terms. Id.
1.  At issue with respect to the OASU retirees is whether OEA committed to provide  them with lifetime prescription drug benefits. In concluding that OEA made no  such promise, the district court accepted the following chain of reasoning: (1)  when the OASU retirees left active employment, the collective bargaining  agreement said that, “[a]fter the retiree reaches age 65, the Association is  required to provide only major-medical coverage,” JA 1086; (2) the benefits  provided to active employees under the collective bargaining agreement at that  time fell into distinct categories: “hospitalization; surgical; major-medical;  out-patient X-ray; EKG; laboratory; prescription drug; dental; and optical,” id.  at 1080 (emphases added); and (3) the independent provision for “prescription  drug” and “major-medical” coverage for active employees suggests that, when OEA  said it would “provide only major-medical coverage” for retirees, it would not  provide prescription drug coverage for them. In one sense, we accept this chain  of reasoning as well. The explicit limitation of healthcare benefits for  retirees to “major-medical” plainly indicates that OEA did not commit to provide  “prescription drug” coverage as well. But this limitation means only that the  promise of majormedical coverage does not include the formal package of benefits  provided under the “prescription drug” heading in the agreement. It does not  mean that “major-medical” may never include prescription drugs. It shows only  that major-medical insurance should not be interpreted to provide the retirees  the same level of prescription drug coverage they had enjoyed prior to age 65.  When retirees suffer a “major-medical” illness or injury, the contract is at  least ambiguous as to whether OEA will provide the retirees with coverage for  the drugs necessary to treat that condition. The OASU retirees have presented  extrinsic evidence backing up this position. Although the retirees’ summary plan  description also contains a section for a “Prescription Drug Program,” JA 1823,  distinct from the section for “Major Medical Benefits,” JA 1816, the  major-medical section explicitly provides some coverage for “prescription drugs  as specified in the Schedule of Benefits,” JA 1820. Notes from the contract  negotiations also indicate that drug and major-medical coverages overlap. In the  face of this language of the agreement and this extrinsic evidence, summary  judgment cannot be granted to OEA solely on the basis of the scope of benefits  outlined in the collective bargaining agreement.
2. The pertinent PSU  collective bargaining agreement’s provision for post-65 retiree benefits also  raises material ambiguities. Here are the relevant provisions: No. 06-4393  Prater et al. v. Ohio Education Association Page 5
11.0141 Continuation of  Benefits The Association shall continue to provide all benefits provided [for  active employees] by Sections 11.0112 and 11.0113 of this Contract for each  retired employee to age sixty-five (65).
11.0142 Reimbursement for Cost of  Medicare The Association shall reimburse each retired employee over age  sixty-five
(65) for the cost of Medicare Part B.
11.0143 Supplement to  Medicare The Association shall supplement the benefits of Medicare Parts A and B  to provide benefits at a level equal to those benefits provided by Sections
11.0112 and 11.0113 of this Contract for each retired employee to age  sixtyfive
(65). JA 1357; JA 1468; JA 1547–48. The question, as framed by the  parties, is whether the clause “to age sixty-five” in the “Supplement to  Medicare” subsection cuts off coverage after age 65. As OEA sees it, the “to age  sixty-five” clause in the “Continuation of Benefits” subsection plainly places a  limit on liability and accordingly the same clause must be read the same way in  the “Supplement to Medicare” subsection. The PSU retirees respond that the  latter half of the “Supplement to Medicare” subsection must be interpreted as a  comparative clause under which OEA commits to provide retirees with coverage  “equal to” that which they had been given up “to age sixty-five.” Although  courts “should construe terms so as to render none nugatory and avoid illusory  promises,” McCoy, 390 F.3d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted), the task  is not always that easy: Inartful drafting sometimes leaves courts with  competing interpretations that both render other provisions of the contract  superfluous or at least awkward. This is such a case. On the one hand, the  retirees’ interpretation renders the same phrase—“to age sixty five”—as a limit  on coverage in one subsection and almost meaningless two subsections later. On  the other hand, OEA’s interpretation creates problems of its own. Reading “to  age sixty-five” to cut off coverage at 65 in both provisions renders the promise  of a “Supplement to Medicare” meaningless because the “Continuation of Benefits”  subsection already promises PSU retirees that same level of coverage up to age  65. Although OEA hypothesizes that this provision allows them to take advantage  of government benefits to fulfill that duty, the “Supplement to Medicare”  provision is structured as an obligation rather than something the union may do.  As a general rule, moreover, only people with disabilities may receive Medicare  before age 65, and OEA’s interpretation renders a subsection that appears to be  applicable to all retirees relevant only to a small subset of them. Also  supporting the retirees’ reading is the fact that all of the language following  the “equal to” phrase parrots the language in the “Continuation of Benefits”  subsection, suggesting that the clause has a comparative, not a restrictive,  purpose to it. As we see it, then, the agreement is at least ambiguous when it  comes to whether it provides post-65 supplemental insurance. The extrinsic  evidence—the affidavits submitted by the retirees and OEA’s consistent practice  of providing supplemental insurance—sufficiently supports the PSU retirees’  position to raise a material factual dispute over the meaning of the pertinent  contract. No. 06-4393 Prater et al. v. Ohio Education Association Page 6 B. The  district court also held that OEA reserved the right to terminate or modify  benefits through several summary plan descriptions. We disagree. As a general  rule, “an existing contract cannot be unilaterally modified.” Baptist Physician  Hosp. Org., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 481 F.3d 337, 350  (6th Cir. 2007); see also Nagle Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Heskett,  585 N.E.2d 866, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(“A contract cannot be unilaterally  modified.”); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 410 (“A signed contract . . . cannot be  changed without the consent or subsequent agreement of the parties.”). Were it  otherwise, the option of either party to modify a contract unilaterally would  defeat the essential purpose of reaching an agreement in the first place—to bind  the parties prospectively. This principle applies with equal force to  collective-bargaining agreements, where employers are statutorily barred from  effectuating “unilateral modification[s] of . . . existing collective bargaining  agreement[s].” N.L.R.B. v. Ford Bros., Inc., 786 F.2d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1986)  (per curiam). Even when an employer enters bankruptcy, the law “prohibits the  employer from unilaterally modifying any provision of the collective bargaining  agreement.” In re Unimet Corp.,
842 F.2d 879, 884 (6th Cir. 1988); see 11  U.S.C. § 1113. One of our decisions, Maurer, complicates matters. There, we held  that a summary plan description, issued after a collective bargaining agreement  had been signed, prevented retiree benefits from vesting because it reserved the  right of the employer to “curtail or eliminate coverage for any treatment,  procedure, or service regardless of whether [the employee is currently]  receiving treatment.” Maurer, 212 F.3d at 913. Because the reservation of rights  was conspicuous and unqualified, we held, “the Union was obligated to grieve or  enter suit” if it disagreed with the employer’s assertion of authority—even if  that assumption of authority came after the effective date of the relevant  collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 919 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In McCoy, we limited Maurer to “unqualified reservation-of-rights language,” 390  F.3d at
424, that claims a “unilateral right by the employer to terminate  coverage without regard to existing or future collective bargaining agreements,”  id. at 425. Because the summary at issue in McCoy said that any “termination” of  benefits was “subject to the provisions of any applicable collective bargaining  agreement,” we held that it could not “fairly . . . have prompted the union  immediately to protest.” Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted). McCoy,  we acknowledge, involved a preliminary-injunction decision and thus turned on  our review of a likelihood-of-success determination, not a final merits  determination. But we stand by this clarification of Maurer because a broad  reading of the decision would run headlong into the rule that a plan summary  “cannot vitiate contractually vested or bargained-for-rights.” Halliburton Co.  Benefits Comm. v. Graves, 463 F.3d 360, 378 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A]  reservation-of-rights clause in a plan document, which allows a company to amend  or terminate a plan at any time, cannot vitiate contractually vested or  bargained-for rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). To our knowledge, no  court of appeals has forced unions to file grievances in the face of a summary  plan description that purported to remove a promise of lifetime health benefits.  As in Maurer, OEA’s summary plan descriptions contained reservation-of-rights  language. See JA 1832 (OASU summary stating that “[w]hile the employer expects  retiree coverage to continue, the employer reserves the right to modify or  discontinue retiree coverage at any time”); JA 1934 (PSU summary reserving the  right to “change or eliminate benefits under the plan and . . . terminate the  entire plan or any portion of it”). But unlike Maurer, these clauses were not  sufficiently unqualified to “fairly . . . have prompted the union immediately to  protest.” McCoy, 390 F.3d at 425. As in McCoy, neither summary explicitly  represented to the retirees that existing medical treatment could be cut off, as  the summary in Maurer did. See id. at 424. And as in McCoy, No. 06-4393 Prater  et al. v. Ohio Education Association Page 7 the OASU summary explicitly claimed  to be established “in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement,” JA  1801, and referenced the bargaining agreement every time it mentioned potential  modifications. Perhaps most importantly, both the PSU and OASU agreements say  that the contracts represent the full commitments between the parties and that  the agreements cannot be amended without signed, mutual consent, a clause never  mentioned, much less discussed, with respect to the Maurer collective bargaining  agreement. When a contract contains formal procedures requiring mutual, written  assent to amend, that language preempts future unilateral termination of rights.  See Pleasantview Nursing Home, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 351 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir.  2003) (holding that oral modification of a collective bargaining agreement was  ineffective in the presence of “an express zipper clause prohibiting  modification except by written agreement”); Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc. v.  N.L.R.B., No. 87-5369, 1988 WL 24225, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 1998) (per  curiam) (affirming NLRB’s finding of unfair labor practice when an employer’s  “unilateral action” breached a collective bargaining agreement’s formal  amendment clause and rejecting an argument that the union waived its right to  complain through inaction). On this record, the unions thus could not fairly be  “compelled to protest the SPD language,” McCoy, 390 F.3d at 425—at least when  the summary does not explicitly renounce the collective bargaining  agreement—because both sets of contracts explicitly said that their  bargained-for rights could not be terminated in such a manner. The summaries  instead serve as extrinsic evidence regarding the extent of the employer’s  promise of future healthcare benefits and whether the parties intended the  benefits to vest. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481–82. They cannot, however, be  interpreted to permit the unilateral termination of these alleged contractual  rights. III. The retirees also challenge the district court’s denial of their  motion for class certification and their motion to amend their complaint. As to  the first motion, the court premised its denial of the class-certification  motion on its summary judgment decision. D. Ct. Op. at 16. We accordingly remand  the case to the district court to address class certification in the first  instance. As to the second motion, the district court did not abuse its  discretion. See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Denial  of a motion for leave to amend is reviewed by this court for an abuse of  discretion.”). Leave to amend, it is true, should be “freely given when justice  so requires,” but it can be denied on the basis of “undue delay, bad faith or  dilatory motive . . . [or] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,  182 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. And  our court, it is also true, has required “at least some significant showing of  prejudice” to deny a motion to amend based solely upon delay. Moore v. City of  Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Taken together,  however, the retirees’ delay, the late stage of the case when the motion was  filed and the likely futility of any amendment show that the district court  acted well within its discretion. The timing of the motion undermines  plaintiffs’ position. They moved for leave to amend on January 13, 2006, nine  months after the amendment deadline created by the magistrate judge’s pretrial  order. By the time the retirees filed the motion, the parties had fully briefed  the summary judgment motions and exchanged a substantial number of documents  through discovery. Even if the retirees were not aware of their potential ERISA  claims at the outset of the litigation, they had sufficient information to bring  these claims long before they filed their motion. The requested amendment also  would have added little, if any, value to their complaint. The retirees  acknowledge that their proposed ERISA claim “parallel[s]” their existing LMRA  claim, Br. at 43, because the two claims rise or fall on the same contractual  terms, see Teamster’s Local 348 Health & Welfare Fund v. Kohn Beverage Co.,  749 F.2d 315, 317 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that, No. 06-4393 Prater et al. v.  Ohio Education Association Page 8 where an obligation arises “under the  collective bargaining agreement[,] . . . the inquiry relative to both the LMRA  claims and ERISA claims is identical”). To the extent the retirees hope to raise  distinct breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims under ERISA, that claim almost  assuredly would be futile. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.  73, 78 (1995) (“[A] company does not act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding  to amend or terminate a welfare benefits plan.”) (quoting Adams v. Avondale  Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990)). IV. For these reasons, we  reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment, affirm its denial of the  plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint and remand for further  proceedings.
Labels: OEA, Ohio Education Association